The Army's counter-insurgency strategy, co-written by Gen. Petraeus (Army Field Manual 3-24 if anyone's interested) calls for 25 troops per every 1000 civilians to stabilize a country. For most of the Iraq War, we've been operating at 7:1000 (see Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.)
Furthermore, FM 3-24 states that the military operations should only account for 20% of the activity in counter-insurgency done right. The other 80% should be economic and political reform, rebuilding infrastructure, etc. On this, we have screwed the pooch.
We've been told over and over again that we can't win the war on terror militarily, yet that's all we've tried. It's all we've tried because it's really all we have to try. Without adequate troop support to stabilize
In On War, Clausewitz said that the most important decision a commander or policy maker had to make was to determine the kind of war they were fighting and not try to make it something that it was not. From the beginning, the Bush administration tried to make the war in
Honestly, at this point, I'm not sure that the situation in
Thoughts, opinions, and the occasional rant about politics, religion, and life in general.
Wednesday, May 09, 2007
Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated
Okay, so it’s been almost six months since I’ve updated this thing, which means…I have a lot to say. I just won’t say it all now. I’d like to enjoy my first night of freedom after the semester ended. So, let’s talk about…Iraq . Hmm…now there’s a shocker.
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